What happened
Rabin's government is remembered, accurately, as the one that took the biggest political risk for peace of any Israeli government before or since. It is recorded alongside that same government's continued settlement approvals because both things are true simultaneously, and the project's standard applies here just as it does to every other government in this ledger: intentions and headline achievements do not cancel out contradictory policy carried out in parallel.
Settlement numbers roughly doubled in the West Bank between the start of the Oslo process and the end of the decade, continuing through Rabin's government and accelerating further under Netanyahu's first term that followed. Rabin's own defenders point out he did attempt some settlement restraint compared to his predecessors and successors, freezing new construction starts in a number of ideological outposts — but the overall trend of continued net growth is not disputed by any serious historian of the period, Israeli or Palestinian. The practical effect was that the land available for a Palestinian state kept shrinking throughout the very years the two sides were supposedly negotiating toward one.